

# A Defense Of The Explanatory Argument For Physicalism

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## *Autonomy Platonism and the Indispensability Argument* - Russell Marcus 2015-06-11

Mathematical platonism is the view that mathematical statements are true of real mathematical objects like numbers, shapes, and sets. One central problem with platonism is that numbers, shapes, sets, and the like are not perceivable by our senses. In contemporary philosophy, the most common defense of platonism uses what is known as the indispensability argument. According to the indispensabilist, we can know about mathematics because mathematics is essential to science. Platonism is among the most persistent philosophical views. Our mathematical beliefs are among our most entrenched. They have survived the demise of millennia of failed scientific theories. Once established, mathematical theories are rarely rejected, and never for reasons of their inapplicability to empirical science. *Autonomy Platonism and the Indispensability Argument* is a defense of an alternative to indispensability platonism. The autonomy platonist believes that mathematics is independent of empirical science: there is purely mathematical evidence for purely mathematical theories which are even more compelling to believe than empirical science. Russell Marcus begins by contrasting autonomy platonism and indispensability platonism. He then argues against a variety of indispensability arguments in the first half of the book. In the latter half, he defends a new approach to a traditional platonistic view, one which includes appeals to a priori but fallible

methods of belief acquisition, including mathematical intuition, and a natural adoption of ordinary mathematical methods. In the end, Marcus defends his intuition-based autonomy platonism against charges that the autonomy of mathematics is viciously circular. This book will be useful to researchers, graduate students, and advanced undergraduates with interests in the philosophy of mathematics or in the connection between science and mathematics.

## **Philosophical Papers : Volume I** - David Lewis Professor of Philosophy Princeton University 1983-06-23

The first volume of this series presents fifteen selected papers dealing with a variety of topics in ontology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.

## **Pragmatism, Law, and Language** - Graham Hubbs 2013-11-12

This volume puts leading pragmatists in the philosophy of language, including Robert Brandom, in contact with scholars concerned with what pragmatism has come to mean for the law. Each contribution uses the resources of pragmatism to tackle fundamental problems in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of law, and social and political philosophy. In many chapters, the version of pragmatism deployed proves a fruitful approach to its subject matter; in others, shortcomings of the specific brand of pragmatism are revealed. The result is a clearer understanding of what pragmatism has meant and can mean across these tightly related philosophical areas. The book, then, is itself pragmatism in action: it seeks to clarify its

unifying concept by examining the practices that centrally involve it.

**Reasons First** - Mark Schroeder 2021

"The last fifty years or more of ethical theory have been preoccupied by a turn to reasons. The vocabulary of reasons has become a common currency not only in ethics, but in epistemology, action theory, and many related areas. It is now common, for example, to see central theses such as evidentialism in epistemology and egalitarianism in political philosophy formulated in terms of reasons. And some have even claimed that the vocabulary of reasons is so useful precisely because reasons have analytical and explanatory priority over other normative concepts - that reasons in that sense come first. *Reasons First* systematically explores both the benefits and burdens of the hypothesis that reasons do indeed come first in normative theory, against the conjecture that theorizing in both ethics and epistemology can only be hampered by neglect of the other. Bringing two decades of work on reasons in both ethics and epistemology to bear, Mark Schroeder argues that some of the most important challenges to the idea that reasons could come first are themselves the source of some of the most obstinate puzzles in epistemology - about how perceptual experience could provide evidence about the world, and about what can make evidence sufficient to justify belief. And he shows that along with moral worth, one of the very best cases for the fundamental explanatory power of reasons in normative theory actually comes from knowledge"--

**From Normativity to Responsibility** - Joseph Raz 2011-12-08

What are our duties or rights? How should we act? What are we responsible for? Joseph Raz examines the philosophical issues underlying these everyday questions. He explores the nature of normativity--the reasoning behind certain beliefs and emotions about how we should behave--and offers a novel account of responsibility.

**Explaining the Reasons We Share** - Mark Schroeder 2014-05-22

Normative ethical theories generally purport to be explanatory—to tell us not just what is good, or what conduct is right, but why. Drawing on both historical and contemporary approaches,

Mark Schroeder offers a distinctive picture of how such explanations must work, and of the specific commitments that they incur. According to Schroeder, explanatory moral theories can be perfectly general only if they are reductive, offering accounts of what it is for something to be good, right, or what someone ought to do. So ambitious, highly general normative ethical theorizing is continuous with metaethical inquiry. Moreover, he argues that such explanatory theories face a special challenge in accounting for reasons or obligations that are universally shared, and develops an autonomy-based strategy for meeting this challenge, in the case of requirements of rationality. Explaining the *Reasons We Share* pulls together over a decade of work by one of the leading figures in contemporary metaethics. One new and ten previously published papers weave together treatments of reasons, reduction, supervenience, instrumental rationality, and legislation, to paint a sharp contrast between two plausible but competing pictures of the nature and limits of moral explanation—one from Cudworth and one indebted to Kant. A substantive new introduction provides a map to reading these essays as a unified argument, and qualifies their conclusions in light of Schroeder's current views. Along with its sister volume, *Expressing Our Attitudes*, this volume advances the theme that metaethical inquiry is continuous with other areas of philosophy.

**Ethics and Moral Philosophy** - Thom Brooks 2011-10-28

Ethics and moral philosophy is an area of particular interest today. This book brings together some of the most important essays in this area. Topics include practical reason, particularism, moral realism, virtue ethics, and ethics and moral philosophy more generally.

**A Philosophical Critique of Empirical Arguments for Postmortem Survival** -

Michael Sudduth 2016-01-26

Sudduth provides a critical exploration of classical empirical arguments for survival arguments that purport to show that data collected from ostensibly paranormal phenomena constitute good evidence for the survival of the self after death. Utilizing the conceptual tools of formal epistemology, he argues that classical arguments are

unsuccessful.

**Moral Knowledge: Volume 18, Part 2** - Ellen Frankel Paul 2001-08-13

This volume discusses the nature of moral knowledge and whether it exists.

**The Knowledge Argument** - Sam Coleman 2019-09-19

A cutting-edge and groundbreaking set of new essays by top philosophers on key topics related to the ever-influential knowledge argument.

Reason and Explanation - T. Poston 2014-08-03

In this new explanationist account of epistemic justification, Poston argues that the explanatory virtues provide all the materials necessary for a plausible account of justified belief. There are no purely autonomous reasons. Rather reasons occur only within an explanatory coherent set of beliefs.

**Taking Morality Seriously** - David Enoch 2011-07-28

In *Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism* David Enoch develops, argues for, and defends a strongly realist and objectivist view of ethics and normativity more broadly. This view—according to which there are perfectly objective, universal, moral and other normative truths that are not in any way reducible to other, natural truths—is familiar, but this book is the first in-detail development of the positive motivations for the view into reasonably precise arguments. And when the book turns defensive—defending Robust Realism against traditional objections—it mobilizes the original positive arguments for the view to help with fending off the objections. The main underlying motivation for Robust Realism developed in the book is that no other metaethical view can vindicate our taking morality seriously. The positive arguments developed here—the argument from the deliberative indispensability of normative truths, and the argument from the moral implications of metaethical objectivity (or its absence)—are thus arguments for Robust Realism that are sensitive to the underlying, pre-theoretical motivations for the view.

**New Perspectives on Type Identity** - Simone Gozzano 2012-03-08

The type identity theory, according to which types of mental state are identical to types of physical state, fell out of favour for some years

but is now being considered with renewed interest. Many philosophers are critically re-examining the arguments which were marshalled against it, finding in the type identity theory both resources to strengthen a comprehensive, physicalistic metaphysics and a useful tool in understanding the relationship between developments in psychology and new results in neuroscience. This volume brings together leading philosophers of mind, whose essays challenge in new ways the standard objections to type identity theory, such as the multiple realizability objection and the modal argument. Other essays show how cognitive science and neuroscience are lending new support to type identity theory and still others provide, extend and improve traditional arguments concerning the theory's explanatory power.

**The Redeemed Good Defense** - Anthony MacPherson 2021-07-06

"Why God?" Everyday this question is uttered in sorrow, bewilderment, or anger. This cry is the problem of suffering. It is also known as the problem of evil. It asks why a good, all-powerful God allows evil and pain. Theodicy is the name of the theological responses that seek to defend God against charges of unfairness. Traditional theodicies have been accused of intensifying the problem by claiming that God is justified in allowing evil because he uses it to bring about a greater good. This greater-good approach has been criticized in more recent times. It seems to uncomfortably align God and evil too closely together. Does God need evil in order to bring good? This study explores an alternative stream of theodicy found in the idea of cosmic warfare. In this theodicy God fights evil in its moral, physical, spiritual, and supernatural forms. This book explores the world of theodicy and its cosmic warfare forms. It navigates the theological and ethical minefields involved. Building on the idea that God is in the midst of a great cosmic controversy, it seeks to further the conversation and articulates a new alternative "redeemed good defense."

**Pragmatic Reasons** - J. Koons 2009-04-22

This book shows how a sophisticated version of pragmatism, resting on a novel conception of rationality, can justify a range of important practices, including our practices of moral and

epistemic evaluation, as well as our practice of making judgments regarding free will and moral responsibility.

*The Philosophical Defence of Psychiatry* - Lawrie Reznek 2005-07-08

By first analysing the arguments of psychiatry's critics and the philosophical ideas of such thinkers as Freud, Eysenck, Laing, Szasz, Sedgwick and Foucault and by then providing answers to the many contentious and diverse questions raised, Dr. Reznek aims to establish a philosophical defence of the theory and practice of psychiatry. As both a qualified philosopher and psychiatrist, the author is exceptionally p[lace]d to undertake the examination of a subject which has hitherto remained untackled. It will be easily accessible to a wide variety of non-specialists as well. It will be of specific interest to those involved in the practice of philosophy, psychiatry, clinical psychology, social work and psychiatric nursing.

Letters to Doubting Thomas - C. Stephen Layman 2007

The evidence for the existence of God is explored in this series of fictionalized letters between a philosopher and an old college friend who appeals to him for help in sorting out his thoughts about God.

Philosophy of Mind - Jaegwon Kim 2018-04-19

This book explores a range of issues in the philosophy of mind, with the mind-body problem as the main focus. It serves as a stimulus to the reader to engage with the problems of the mind and try to come to terms with them, and examines Descartes's mind-body dualism.

Understanding, Explanation, and Scientific Knowledge - Kareem Khalifa 2017-10-05

The first comprehensive exploration of the nature and value of understanding, addressing burgeoning debates in epistemology and philosophy of science.

**A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism** - Jarrett Leplin 1997-08-07

Vigorous and controversial, this book develops a sustained argument for a realist interpretation of science, based on a new analysis of the concept of predictive novelty. Identifying a form of success achieved in science--the successful prediction of novel empirical results--which can be explained only by attributing some measure of truth to the theories that yield it, Jarrett

Leplin demonstrates the incapacity of nonrealist accounts to accommodate novel success and constructs a deft realist explanation of novelty.

To test the applicability of novel success as a standard of warrant for theories, Leplin examines current directions in theoretical physics, fashioning a powerful critique of currently developing standards of evaluation. Arguing that explanatory uniqueness warrants inference, and exposing flaws in contending philosophical positions that sever explanatory power from epistemic justification, Leplin holds that abductive, or explanatory, inference is as fundamental as enumerative or eliminative inference, and contends that neither induction nor abduction can proceed without the other on pain of generating paradoxes. Leplin's conception of novelty has two basic components: an independence condition, ensuring that a result novel for a theory have no essential role, even indirectly, in the theory's provenance; and a uniqueness condition, ensuring that no competing theory provides a basis for predicting the same result. Showing that alternative approaches to novelty fall short in both respects, Leplin proceeds to a series of test cases, engaging prominent scientific theories from nineteenth-century accounts of light to modern cosmology in an effort to demonstrate the epistemological superiority of his view.

Ambitious and tightly argued, *A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism* advances new positions on major topics in philosophy of science and offers a version of realism as original as it is compelling, making it essential reading for philosophers of science, epistemologists, and scholars in science studies.

*Physicalism, or Something Near Enough* - Jaegwon Kim 2007-12-03

Contemporary discussions in philosophy of mind have largely been shaped by physicalism, the doctrine that all phenomena are ultimately physical. Here, Jaegwon Kim presents the most comprehensive and systematic presentation yet of his influential ideas on the mind-body problem. He seeks to determine, after half a century of debate: What kind of (or "how much") physicalism can we lay claim to? He begins by laying out mental causation and consciousness as the two principal challenges to contemporary physicalism. How can minds exercise their

causal powers in a physical world? Is a physicalist account of consciousness possible? The book's starting point is the "supervenience" argument (sometimes called the "exclusion" argument), which Kim reformulates in an extended defense. This argument shows that the contemporary physicalist faces a stark choice between reductionism (the idea that mental phenomena are physically reducible) and epiphenomenalism (the view that mental phenomena are causally impotent). Along the way, Kim presents a novel argument showing that Cartesian substance dualism offers no help with mental causation. Mind-body reduction, therefore, is required to save mental causation. But are minds physically reducible? Kim argues that all but one type of mental phenomena are reducible, including intentional mental phenomena, such as beliefs and desires. The apparent exceptions are the intrinsic, felt qualities of conscious experiences ("qualia"). Kim argues, however, that certain relational properties of qualia, in particular their similarities and differences, are behaviorally manifest and hence in principle reducible, and that it is these relational properties of qualia that are central to their cognitive roles. The causal efficacy of qualia, therefore, is not entirely lost. According to Kim, then, while physicalism is not the whole truth, it is the truth near enough.

**Contemporary Dualism** - Andrea Lavazza  
2014-02-03

Ontological materialism, in its various forms, has become the orthodox view in contemporary philosophy of mind. This book provides a variety of defenses of mind-body dualism, and shows (explicitly or implicitly) that a thoroughgoing ontological materialism cannot be sustained. The contributions are intended to show that, at the very least, ontological dualism (as contrasted with a dualism that is merely linguistic or epistemic) constitutes a philosophically respectable alternative to the monistic views that currently dominate thought about the mind-body (or, perhaps more appropriately, person-body) relation.

Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems - Iyad Rahwan  
2009-02-16

During the last decade Argumentation has been gaining importance within Artificial Intelligence

especially in multi agent systems.

Argumentation is a powerful mechanism for modelling the internal reasoning of an agent. It also provides tools for analysing, designing and implementing sophisticated forms of interaction among rational agents, thus making important contributions to the theory and practice of multiagent dialogues. Application domains include: nonmonotonic reasoning, legal disputes, business negotiation, labor disputes, team formation, scientific inquiry, deliberative democracy, ontology reconciliation, risk analysis, scheduling, and logistics. This volume presents the latest developments in this area at the interface of argumentation theory and multi agent systems. The 10 revised full papers presented together with 3 invited papers from the AAMAS 2008 conference were carefully reviewed and selected from numerous submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on argument-based reasoning, argumentation and dialogue, as well as strategic and pragmatic issues.

**Consciousness and Physicalism** - Andreas Elpidorou  
2018-04-19

Consciousness and Physicalism: A Defense of a Research Program explores the nature of consciousness and its place in the world, offering a revisionist account of what it means to say that consciousness is nothing over and above the physical. By synthesizing work in the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and philosophy of science from the last twenty years and forging a dialogue with contemporary research in the empirical sciences of the mind, Andreas Elpidorou and Guy Dove advance and defend a novel formulation of physicalism. Although physicalism has been traditionally understood to be a metaphysical thesis, Elpidorou and Dove argue that there is an alternative and indeed preferable understanding of physicalism that both renders physicalism a scientifically informed explanatory project and allows us to make important progress in addressing the ontological problem of consciousness. Physicalism, Elpidorou and Dove hold, is best viewed not as a thesis (metaphysical or otherwise) but as an interdisciplinary research program that aims to compositionally explain all natural phenomena that are central to our understanding of our place in nature.

Consciousness and Physicalism is replete with philosophical arguments and informed, through and through, by findings in many areas of scientific research. It advances the debate regarding the ontological status of consciousness. It will interest students and scholars in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, philosophy of cognitive science, and philosophy of science. And it will challenge both foes and friends of physicalism.

*Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems* - Nicolas Maudet 2007-11-04

Argumentation provides tools for designing, implementing and analyzing sophisticated forms of interaction among rational agents. It has made a solid contribution to the practice of multiagent dialogues. This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed post-proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems held in Hakodate, Japan, as an associated event of AAMAS 2006, the main international conference on autonomous agents and multi-agent systems.

*Socio-Historical Examination of Religion and Ministry, Volume 2, Issue 1* - Darren M. Slade 2020-05-01

Socio-Historical Examination of Religion and Ministry (SHERM journal) is a biannual, not-for-profit, free peer-reviewed academic journal that publishes the latest social-scientific, historiographic, and ecclesiastic research on religious institutions and their ministerial practices. SHERM is dedicated to the critical and scholarly inquiry of historical and contemporary religious phenomena, both from within particular religious traditions and across cultural boundaries, so as to inform the broader socio-historical analysis of religion and its related fields of study. The purpose of SHERM is to provide a scholarly medium for the social-scientific study of religion where specialists can publish advanced studies on religious trends, theologies, rituals, philosophies, socio-political influences, or experimental and applied ministry research in the hopes of generating enthusiasm for the vocational and academic study of religion while fostering collegiality among religious specialists. Its mission is to provide academics, professionals, and nonspecialists with critical reflections and evidence-based insights into the socio-historical study of religion and, where

appropriate, its implications for ministry and expressions of religiosity.

**Evidentialism and Its Discontents** - Trent Dougherty 2011-08-25

In this ground-breaking book, leading epistemologists challenge and refine evidentialism, the view that epistemic justification for belief is determined solely by considerations pertaining to one's evidence. Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, the leading advocates of evidentialism, respond to each essay in this engaging and illuminating debate. *Purposive Behaviour and Teleological Explanations* - Frank Honywill George 1985

*A Dialogue on Explanation* - C. Mantzavinos 2019-01-01

This book introduces a panorama of the philosophical theory of explanation. Written as a philosophical dialogue between two interlocutors, Philip and a student, it presents a defense of the position of explanatory pluralism. The fictional dialogue takes place on Cape Sounion, near Athens, where the two interlocutors are enjoying the view over the Aegean Sea. An initial exchange of arguments leads to a dialogue unfolding the development of the contemporary philosophical theory of explanation. The second part of the dialogue is devoted to an exchange of arguments on explanatory pluralism as a novel approach to the philosophical theory of explanation. The two also discuss historical cases as well as the ways of achieving explanatory progress in science. We are all philosophers and we develop our own philosophy by exchanging views and arguments. The dialogue form is and should remain the principal form of philosophizing, since ideas do not merely exist - they develop. This is certainly the case in real-world philosophical interaction, and as this book aptly demonstrates, it can also be the case in written philosophical exposition.

**The Conscious Mind** - David J. Chalmers 1997 Writing in a rigorous, thought-provoking style, the author takes us on a far-reaching tour through the philosophical ramifications of consciousness, offering provocative insights into the relationship between mind and brain.

*Oxford Studies in Metaethics : Volume II* - Russ Shafer-Landau 2007-04-19

*Oxford Studies in Metaethics* is the only

periodical publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work on the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship in the field. Its broad purview includes work at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. OSME provides an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.

Divine Providence - Thomas P. Flint 2018-09-05  
Thomas P. Flint develops and defends the idea of divine providence sketched by Luis de Molina, the sixteenth-century Jesuit theologian. The Molinist account of divine providence reconciles two claims long thought to be incompatible: that God is the all-knowing governor of the universe and that individual freedom can prevail only in a universe free of absolute determinism. The Molinist concept of middle knowledge holds that God knows, though he has no control over, truths about how any individual would freely choose to act in any situation, even if the person never encounters that situation. Given such knowledge, God can be truly providential while leaving his creatures genuinely free. Divine Providence is by far the most detailed and extensive presentation of the Molinist view ever written. Middle knowledge is hotly debated in philosophical theology, and the controversy spills over into metaphysics and moral philosophy as well. Flint ably defends the concept against its most influential contemporary critics, and shows its importance to Christian practice. With particular originality and sophistication, he applies Molinism to such aspects of providence as prayer, prophecy, and the notion of papal infallibility, teasing out the full range of implications for traditional Christianity.

*Rainbow of Experiences, Critical Trust, and God* - Kai-man Kwan 2011-08-11

Defends a new type of epistemology, the Critical Trust Approach, and then applies it to the experience of God in the contemporary multicultural context.

*Moral Psychology with Nietzsche* - Brian Leiter 2019-04-04

Brian Leiter defends a set of radical ideas from

Nietzsche: there is no objectively true morality, there is no free will, no one is ever morally responsible, and our conscious thoughts and reasoning play almost no significant role in our actions and how our lives unfold. He presents a new interpretation of main themes of Nietzsche's moral psychology, including his anti-realism about value (including epistemic value), his account of moral judgment and its relationship to the emotions, his conception of the will and agency, his scepticism about free will and moral responsibility, his epiphenomenalism about certain kinds of conscious mental states, and his views about the heritability of psychological traits. In combining exegesis with argument, Leiter engages the views of philosophers like Harry Frankfurt, T. M. Scanlon, and Gary Watson, and psychologists including Daniel Wegner, Benjamin Libet, and Stanley Milgram. Nietzsche emerges not simply as a museum piece from the history of ideas, but as a philosopher and psychologist who exceeds David Hume for insight into human nature and the human mind, repeatedly anticipates later developments in empirical psychology, and continues to offer sophisticated and unsettling challenges to much conventional wisdom in both philosophy and psychology.

Moral Psychology with Nietzsche - Brian Leiter 2019

Brian Leiter draws on empirical psychology to defend a set of radical ideas from Nietzsche: there is no objectively true morality, there is no free will, no one is ever morally responsible, and our conscious thoughts play almost no significant role in our actions. Nietzsche emerges as not just a great philosopher but a prescient psychologist.

**Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge** - Associate Professor of Philosophy Torin Alter 2007

Publisher description

The Divine Lawmaker - John Foster 2004-01-15

John Foster presents a clear and powerful discussion of a range of topics relating to our understanding of the universe: induction, laws of nature, and the existence of God. He begins by developing a solution to the problem of induction - a solution whose key idea is that the regularities in the workings of nature that have held in our experience hitherto are to be

explained by appeal to the controlling influence of laws, as forms of natural necessity. His second line of argument focuses on the issue of what we should take such necessitatorial laws to be, and whether we can even make sense of them at all. Having considered and rejected various alternatives, Foster puts forward his own proposal: the obtaining of a law consists in the causal imposing of a regularity on the universe as a regularity. With this causal account of laws in place, he is now equipped to offer an argument for theism. His claim is that natural regularities call for explanation, and that, whatever explanatory role we may initially assign to laws, the only plausible ultimate explanation is in terms of the agency of God. Finally, he argues that, once we accept the existence of God, we need to think of him as creating the universe by a method which imposes regularities on it in the relevant law-yielding way. In this new perspective, the original nomological-explanatory solution to the problem of induction becomes a theological-explanatory solution. The Divine Lawmaker is bold and original in its approach, and rich in argument. The issues on which it focuses are among the most important in the whole epistemological and metaphysical spectrum.

*Sensations* - Christopher S. Hill 1991-01-25

Several rival theories (dualism, double aspect theory, eliminative materialism, and functionalism) are refuted in this defense of type materialism, wherein sensations are possessed only by human beings and members of related biological species.

**Doing Things for Reasons** - Rüdiger Bittner 2001

People do things for reasons, but what are reasons and how are they related to the

resulting actions? Bittner explores this question and proposes an answer: a reason is a response to that state of affairs.

*Thinking about Consciousness* - David Papineau 2002-04-25

The relation between subjective consciousness and the physical brain is widely regarded as the last mystery facing science. This book argues that there is no real puzzle here. Consciousness seems mysterious, not because of any hidden essence, but only because we think about it in a special way. David Papineau exposes the resulting potential for confusion, and shows that much scientific study of consciousness is misconceived. Modern physical science strongly supports a materialist account of consciousness. But there remains considerable resistance to this, both in philosophy and in the way most people think about the mind; we fall back on a dualist view, that consciousness is not part of the material world. Papineau argues that resistance to materialism is groundless. He offers a detailed analysis of the way human beings think about consciousness, and in particular the way in which we humans think about our conscious states by activating those selfsame states. His careful account of this distinctive mode of phenomenal thinking enables him, first, to show that the standard arguments against dualism are unsound, second, to explain why dualism is nevertheless so intuitively persuasive, and third, to expose much contemporary scientific study of consciousness as resting on a confusion. In placing a materialist account of consciousness on a firm foundation, this clear and forthright book lays many traditional problems to rest, and offers escape from immemorial misconceptions about the mind.